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EVALUATING CHANGE IN WATER INSTITUTIONS:
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND COUNTRY EXAMPLES
By Marie Leigh Livingston
I.

INTRODUCTION

Wise use of water resources is central to natural resource policy and economic prosperity
in many countries around the world. While nations may differ in their aspirations and stages of
development, the allocation and use of water resources is often critical to achieving specific
regional and national goals including efficiency, equity and overall social welfare. Because
economic circumstances change over time, it is often necessary or desirable to change the laws
and policy governing water allocation and use in order to solve problems and take advantage of
opportunities.
Historically, physical structural projects have been relied upon to address evolving water
conditions and changing economic needs. More recently, policy makers have turned their
attention to demand side management (like conservation and pricing) in an effort to use the
resource wisely. Most recently, analysts and policy makers have become interested in water
institutions (laws, regulations and policy) and how they can be designed in a way to cope with
change and facilitate the achievement of social and economic goals (Easter et. al., 1998).
This paper outlines the concepts economists use to evaluate how the pressure for
institutional change develops and what dynamics are pertinent to the process of change. From an
economic perspective, it is tempting to reduce the study to a benefit cost analysis. However, the
analysis requires much more. To gain real insight and understanding into the role and
importance of water institutions, the analyst must know something about economics and
political, as well as hydrology, earth sciences, history and culture. The field is complicated and
the analysis is usually neither elegant nor simple.
The overall objective is to generate some insights and ideas into why and how water
institutions change, and what factors to look for in order to evaluate actual change at the micro
and meso level. The micro level refers to the fundamental forces that generate pressure for
institutional innovation, often deriving from individual interests. The meso level refers to the
structure and dynamics of the actual process of institutional change, and the factors that may
facilitate or pose obstacles to innovation.
Throughout the paper, examples from a variety of countries are provided and described in
order to illustrate points and lend some concreteness to the concepts. Economists would expect
country context to generate some diversity in the institutional approaches taken to provide access
to, and to allocate water. Nevertheless, there may well be some overlap in circumstances faced
by different countries and significant opportunities to apply what has been learned from the
experience in one country in order to address and resolve the problems faced by another.
II.

EVALUATING CHANGE AT THE MICRO LEVEL

Evaluating change in water institutions requires some understanding of political
economy. The economic understanding of political economy is rooted in the theory of interest

group politics. The idea is that one must understand the perspective and interests of stakeholders
in order to evaluate the pressure for change and also the potential impacts of actual change.
Interest Group Politics
The theory of interest group politics rests upon the idea that individuals are both rational
and self interested (Olson, 1965). In standard economic analysis, we assume individuals with a
stake in water use and allocation will do their best to meet their own individual objectives, within
the existing structure of rights and laws (the initial endowment of income and other resources
(including water). In this case the logic is extended to assert that individuals with a stake in
water allocation will also seek to change the rules governing allocation in a manner that
promotes their interests. Moreover, individuals will attempt to organize themselves with other
like-minded parties in a concerted effort to change policy by pressuring political actors.
Individuals with a stake in water use and allocation are not limited to water users alone.
Of course, municipal, agricultural and industrial water users who rely on diversions or
extractions to operate their businesses are stakeholders. In addition, however, stakeholders
include non-water users that have an interest in related outputs or instream uses, like wildlife
preservation, recreation and aesthetic environmental quality. Obviously, the goals of interested
parties are not always similar in that they may be either economic or non-economic goals. Even
when all goals are economic, conflicts between interest groups arise.
The ability of a particular interest group to actually organize and bring pressure to bear
on the political system depends on, among other things, 1) the benefits and costs that will be
incurred by individuals as a result of changing the rules and 2) the transactions cost associated
with organizing with other individuals. How policymakers respond to this pressure is another
matter, which is treated in the meso level discussion.
For example, consider a case where a large group of farmers (say two hundred) each have
a stake of $100 in changing a particular water regulation in their favor. However, the cost of
getting organized would involve some travel and legal costs amounting to $125 per farmer. On
the other hand, assume a small set of industrial users (say five) each have a $1000 stake in
maintaining the status quo. Also assume that the transactions cost of organizing the industrial
users is only $150 per firm, perhaps because an annual industry meeting already exists, so that
the potential net gain of $850 is sufficient to stimulate action.
In this case the pressure to change institutions will never materialize, even though the
gains to farmers ($20,000 total) far exceed the potential loss to industry ($5000), because, at the
individual level for farmers, the costs of getting organized more than offset the potential gains,
thereby eliminating the incentive for political action. There are myriad combinations of groups,
stakes and transactions costs that each generates a unique outcome in terms of political economy.
Equilibrium and Evolutionary Change
Institutions are in political economic equilibrium when there is no pressure, or, more
likely, insufficient pressure for change. Institutions are in disequilibrium, and may change when
the political clout of potential winners exceeds the political clout of potential losers (stakeholders
in the status quo). Because there is not a clear, direct and proportional relationship between
potential economic gains and political clout, actual change may or may not enhance economic
efficiency.

Institutions change at different rates and in different directions in different regions and
contexts (North, 1990). Clearly, the natural environment is a factor. Water institutions in arid
countries garner substantially more attention than water policies in humid regions. For example,
in the U.S., in the eastern, more water rich part of the country, the riparian principle was chosen
as the original allocation guide. Under the riparian system, property owners have the right to
utilize bordering streams, with no explicit limit on beneficial use.
In the arid west, water is allocated based on prior appropriation, which requires diversion
from the stream (perhaps to relatively remote locations), with strict limits on the amount of use.
However, even within arid regions, institutional change has varied depending on, among other
things, the structure of interest groups at a particular time, the cultural context from with those
groups and their goals emerge, at the structure of leadership present. For example, while both
Wyoming and Colorado water law rely on prior appropriation, they have substantially different
dispute resolution mechanisms, which were heavily influenced by the philosophy of important
leaders at the time the laws were developed.
Because institutions evolve incrementally over time, evaluating their performance in
inescapably incremental as well. There is no once and for all solution. For example, in the
eastern U.S., many riparian systems have gradually evolved into permit systems, as water has
grown relatively scarce. Evaluating performance in a positive way requires some notion of
improved consistency between social goals and institutional structure. The principles of
efficiency, equity and overall social welfare may be used to evaluate performance since they
indicate the ability of various interest groups to achieve their objectives or, alternatively, face
significant frustration.
Economic Goals and Efficiency
Undoubtedly, the pursuit of direct economic gain is the driving force behind many
changes in water institutions. Agricultural interests and other producers are often primarily in
their profitability. However the extent to which a particular interest group’s economic
improvement corresponds with an overall increase in economic efficiency is only loosely related.
If the interest group in question economic gains are offset by losses elsewhere in the system,
their economic position may improve while overall efficiency declines.
It is indeed fortunate if the objectives of the politically prevailing interest group coincide
with greater economic efficiency. If, however, it does not, economists have a professional
responsibility to identify opportunities to change water institutions in a way that could increase
economic efficiency. Once identified, the challenge becomes making persuasive arguments in
the political arena in order to influence actual policy.
Institutional arrangements are critical in creating incentives because they 1) define who
has access to water resources, 2) establish the range of (legal) choice open to legitimate water
users, and 3) determine who can claim income from use and who will bear the cost of use. As
such, they are primary in terms of structuring incentives and producing the resulting economic
outcome (Bromley, 1982). Economists assert that given the choice domain established by water
institutions, individual water users (and others) will behave rationally in a way that maximizes
the achievement of their economic or non-economic goals. The interaction between users and the
combined result defines the economic outcome at a particular point in time.
Because they create incentives, institutions may also pose a clear obstacle to economic
development. Poorly designed institutions send inaccurate signals to water users about the

benefits and costs that accrue to the system as a result of their use and production choices. When
individuals respond to a partial or erroneous set of information about the economic consequences
of their decisions, the link between individual rational choice and the improvement of overall
economic welfare is broken. Incentives are “perverse” and may encourage individuals to use
water in ways that reduce overall economic net benefits to the whole.
Countries in the former Soviet Bloc, like Poland and the Czech Republic, provide an
excellent, but unfortunate, example of how the lack of economic incentives can lead to seriously
inefficient use of resources. Certainly, in the absence of both resource and product markets, the
political or administrative principles that guided how water was allocated between various
industries and between industrial, domestic, and environmental uses, often led to distributions
that were clearly inefficient from a capitalistic perspective (Livingston, Bochniarz and Bolan,
1995).
Equity
As a guiding principle, economic efficiency is powerful, but limited. While institutional
change is likely to increase or decrease the aggregate net benefits accruing to a society, it will
definitely, and just as fundamentally, change the distribution of those benefits and costs.
Because changing the incidence of benefits and costs is inescapable when water institutions
change, equity must also be central element of evaluation methodology.
Quite often, equity and distributional issues are a motivating force behind interest group
action. Certainly, fairness issues concerning the distribution of water between agricultural and
municipal interests are a common theme in water policy controversies around the world. In
affluent countries, the distribution of water use benefits between traditional (consumptive) uses
and emerging (often environmental, non-consumptive) uses is frequently at issue. In developing
countries, poverty is often the key equity issue in shifting water laws and policies.
Equity concerns are often at the root of water policy issues where the rights of indigenous
peoples are in question. This theme runs across both developed and developing nations.
Institutional issues may concern whether these groups have rights to the water or may address
the extent of damage to which these groups may be exposed as other groups exercise their water
rights.
For example, in the United States, the question of Native American water rights has been
very controversial and has affected water allocation to a great extent in several parts of the
country. The Supreme Court case of Arizona vs. California (373 U.S. 546 (1963)) reaffirmed the
Winters doctrine which establishes the water rights of Native Americans. Winters vs. United
States (207 U.S. 564 1908) states that water rights were in fact granted to Native Americans
when Federal reservations were established (thus the name reserved water rights). The great
majority of Indian water rights went unexercised for many decades, sometimes for a century.
However, they are not lost through non-use, like other water rights in the U.S. Now that these
rights have begun to be used, they have required very substantial changes in rights distributions
(displacing a great number of existing users) and/or huge compensation packages.
Equity issues surrounding indigenous peoples can also affect water institutions by
impacting water development policy. For example, in India, the Sardar Sarovar dam on the
Narmada River has brought serious opposition because it would submerge 37,000 hectares of
land and inundate the traditional homeland of an estimated 67,000 indigenous Indian villagers
(Newsarchives.indianinfo.com, 2003). While the project is intended to bring relief to a drought

prone area of India, it is viewed by many as a large scale abuse of human rights bringing damage
to many poor and underprivileged communities. Along with environmental concerns, this issue
was a factor in the World Bank’s decision to pull funding. While this equity issue is recognized
widely as a significant concern, it has not altered the final decision on the dam, due to the weak
political power of the effected group.
Social Welfare
In some cases, the overall goal behind institutional change is more fundamental than
changing the distribution of benefits and costs. The concern may be the distribution of
economic, legal and social opportunity (as distinct from economic outcomes) and the
redistribution of economic advantage (Bromley, 1989). The socially desired distribution of
economic opportunity reflects a collective attitude about the appropriate social welfare function
for the society.
Certainly, South Africa provides an example of how the overall issue of social welfare
can be a critical factor influencing natural resource policy. This has been the case for South
Africa since the end of apartheid and democratic elections in 1994. Basic access to water for the
entire population, especially those disenfranchised in the apartheid era is a fundamental issue that
South Africa is trying to address with changing water institutions (Backeberg, 2003). Balancing
social welfare objectives with other goals (like cost recovery) is a problem facing a great many
countries in the developing world.
The current importance of social welfare as it pertains to water institutions is perhaps best
illustrated by the very vocal (while perhaps small) international opposition to privatization of
water resources (Gleick, et. al., Pacific Institute, 2003). In this context, privatization refers to
transferring some of the assets or operations of public water systems into private hands. While
there are many concerns including environmental and equity issues, the main arguments against
privatization that point to social welfare concerns are that 1) water provision is (should be) a
basic responsibility of government, 2) privatization may bypass under-represented and underserved communities, 3) privatization agreements often fail to include public participation and
contract monitoring, 4) agreements may lack dispute resolution procedures and 5) privatization
may be irreversible.
This section provides an explanation of the individual motivations that lead individuals to
seek change in water institutions and how the same set of goals can be used to evaluate potential
or actual institutional change from an aggregate viewpoint. The following section turns to the
next level of evaluation at the meso, or middle, level of policymaking. The meso level concerns
the actual process of institutional change and the factors that may facilitate or pose obstacles, to
innovation.
III.

EVALUATING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AT THE MESO LEVEL

In order to better understand the evolution of water institutions in practical terms and
their impact on economic performance and other social goals, this section decomposes the
overall broad notion of institutional change into typologies that capture key analytical and
functional elements. At the meso level, institutional change is evaluated in terms of the factors
that influence the structure and sequencing of change.

Nestedness and Stages of Change
The breadth and depth of water institutions points to the “nestedness” of institutions. The
many levels of water institutions are structurally embedded within each other (Saleth and Dinar,
2003). In this way, a particular rule governing water may be interlinked with a great variety of
water rules, linked together by related institutions at many levels. This interdependent structure
is extremely important in terms of evaluating what kinds of change in water institutions may
actually occur, and what their impact on the system might be.
If several levels of institutions governing water are uncoordinated or conflicting, serious
problems can arise in allocating water rationally and in making progressive changes in policy.
Analysts in many countries cite fragmentation and uncoordinated policy as a problem in water
institutions. For example, in Australia, multiple states have adopted rules and regulations that
fail to recognize cross border impacts, which has resulted in ecological damage and basic
incompatibility in management systems including data collection (McKay, 2003).
When the basic forces stimulating change in fact materialize, actual institutional change
occurs (if it occurs at all) in a stage-based process. While one stage is a necessary prerequisite to
the subsequent stage, the process may stop at any point, due to political social and economic
obstacles. Three fundamental stages include: 1) changes in the perception of needed institutional
change, 2) political articulation of needed changes, 3) steps taken to make changes in water
institutions operational and 4) the actual impact of institutional change (Saleth and Dinar, 2003).
The case of Namibia provides an example of how innovation in water institutions can be
frustrated at one stage of the process (Heyns, 2003). Since 1997, Namibia has gone through
stages one and two of progressive change in water institutions. The need for change has been
perceived and politically articulated. Unfortunately, these changes have encountered significant
trouble in becoming operational, primarily due to the lack of staffing power and funding. Even
though water reform is based on sound rationale, efforts to make change a reality and produce
positive impacts on the water sector have been frustrated.
In the sections that follow, some key concepts that are helpful in evaluating the process of
actual change are outlined. These factors may affect one of the stages of institutional change.
Moreover, there is a considerable feedback effect. Obviously, perception of need affects political
articulation, which in turn may lead to operational changes. In addition, the actual outcome of
any institutional change (stage four) will influence social perceptions, which may well lead to
another round of reform.
The Role of Subjective and Objective Elements in Perception
The perception of needed change in water institutions can result from subjective or
objective elements. Two of the most important objective elements are technology and the
physical environment. Subjective elements include the ideologies of individuals and groups,
biases, and learning.
It is easy to envision how changes in objective resource realities can lead to the
perception that water institutions need to be changed. For example, in Australia, the objective
reality of serious groundwater overdrafts certainly contributed to the perception that collective
caps on groundwater extractions were appropriate (Delforce, et. al., 1990). In some cases,
objective elements external to the water sector may contribute to the pressure for innovation in
water institutions. For example, in Mexico, broader economic realities, particularly debt relief

problems, structural adjustment and the politics of international aid and lending has been a
factor. These elements have been important factors in terms of the growing pressure to liberalize
the water sector (Hearne, 2003).
Subjective elements are just as critical to changing perceptions of need for institutional
change. The “environmental movement” is a perfect illustration of how biases and ideology
evolve by people learning (perhaps from each other). Environmentalism is a “collective attitude”
that has grown and definitely influences how individuals evaluate the world around them. In
New Zealand, it has been observed that the perception of need has evolved continuously from a
focus on flooding, to pollution, to irrigation and then environment (Saleth and Dinar, 2003).
While subjective perception is difficult to measure precisely, it can be estimated via contingent
valuation and other techniques, like the Delphi method, that are utilized by economists.
The impact of this subjective view on institutional innovation is widespread. It has led to
the broad range of changes including the development of instream water rights and proposals to
decommission dams (e.g., Hoover Dam) that symbolize past attempts to manage water resources.
The role of subjective element of pro-environmental attitudes is not limited to democratic states.
This bias was present, and growing, in former Soviet Bloc countries. When Communism
collapsed, these bias were transformed into political action and led to substantial innovations in
natural resource policy, including those that apply to water resources.
The Pervasiveness of Path Dependency
In order to evaluate the prospect for reforms in water institutions in a particular country,
it is critical to consider the significant role of path dependency. Analytically, path dependency
refers to the fact that potential changes in institutions are both constrained and enabled by past
institutional configurations. Even when the range of possibilities is the same across countries,
this does mean each country will face fairly different obstacles in initiating innovations.
Path dependence is a factor that helps explain the variety of institutional approaches taken in
specific countries, as well as very different rates and directions of change.
Water institutions are linked with related (perhaps other natural resource) institutions,
which are, in turn, structurally embedded within the larger legal and agency structure and indeed
the overall structure of a particular national government. Path dependence resulting from the
embeddedness of institutions means the choice of one institutional component can and usually
will affect subsequent institutional arrangements. For example, the general economic
liberalizations effected by China, Spain, and many other countries in recent years have had
positive impacts on the potential for liberalizing the water resource sector as well (Saleth and
Dinar, 2003).
The impact of path dependency, at the broadest level, is clear for countries (like those in
Central Europe), which were part of the former Soviet Bloc. For example, the experience of the
Czech Republic with a totalitarian regime, as well as its history as part of the Austria-Hungarian
Empire, colors the opportunities and obstacles faced at this point in changing water institutions.
Because the value of water associated with both fishing and aesthetic beauty were reflected in
Austro-Hungarian laws of the 19th century, a historical foundation is established that will
facilitate the ability of the Czech government to recognize these values in newly emerging water
institutions (Sauer, 2003). In addition, because of the heavy state role in the post World War II
era, a centrally managed fund for water resource activities may also be less objectionable than in
countries with a different experience.

Institutional Transactions Costs
Once the need for institutional change is perceived, the process of reform requires that
new policy alternatives are articulated and eventually implemented. Essentially, in order for
change to occur, the political powers that be must take advantage of opportunities and provide
leadership. In general, the obstacles that must be overcome, in this regard, can be labeled as
transactions costs.
Transactions costs have been defined by Williamson (1985, p. 2) to be “the effort, time
and expense necessary to obtain the information necessary to make an exchange, negotiate the
exchange and enforce the exchange”. These exchanges are essentially economic contracts.
Traditionally, the notion of transactions costs referred to the ease or difficulty with which
individual economic agents could operate within a given institutional structure. Certainly, the
traditional notion is relevant for many countries. For example, in South Africa, recent reforms
allowing trade in water rights became effective only after administrative authorities (the
Crocodile River Main Irrigation Board) lowered transactions costs by providing both information
and coordination services to farmers who were in a position to sell (Backeberg, 2003).
This powerful concept can also be applied to the transactions costs of modifying existing
institutions and/or creating new institutional arrangement. When applied to institutional change
in the political, rather than economic, sphere, the transactions costs involved refer to costs
perceived by political agents in initiating and effecting reforms. To make matters more
complicated, due to path dependency, the transactions costs change as the process occurs. For
example, the political transactions cost of moving the reform process to midstream and then
returning to the status quo might be far greater than the transactions cost of a full successful
reform.
Within the political arena, political actors have considerable discretion in terms political
contracts they choose to support or oppose. For this reason, political leadership is a key element
in evaluating the potential for institutional change. As discretion grows, leadership and
commitment to reform become more important. The potential for innovation may be “asset
specific”, meaning that the possibilities for action may depend on the specific configuration of
political actors and their relationship to each other.
Supporting an innovation in water institutions is inherently risky, as any deviation from
the status quo will alter power and economic outcomes. In the extreme, political careers may be
at stake. This general principle can be illustrated by an air quality case in Poland. In post
communist Poland, resource policies were undergoing substantial innovations. In 1992, the
environmental minister suggested a substantial reduction in air pollution charges (by 30%).
Scientists, environmentalists and industries which had already undertaken the investment to cut
pollutants, protested. Ultimately, the ministry backed down, and raised charges again. This
experience was a factor in the environmental minister’s resignation from office in 1993
(Livingston, Bochniarz and Bolan, 1995). This example point to the challenge of effecting
change, without significant vacillation in policy, which can disrupt economic activity.

IV.

SUMMARY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

This paper outlines how water institutions can be evaluated at the micro and meso level.
At the micro level, the political economy model can assist in evaluating and understanding the
individual stake holders involved and their diverse motives in seeking or resisting change in
water institutions. Just as importantly, the model helps to evaluate the political power of various
stakeholders, and the likelihood that their aims will find political expression. At the micro level,
the model points to how evolving subjective interests and changing objective realities combine to
shape the forces for institutional change.
At the meso level, the model focuses on the probability that pressure at the micro level
will result in actual change. The role of political agents, and the structure of institutions in the
status quo are critical. Political actors will do their own assessment of the opportunities to be
had by supporting, or initiating, a proposed institutional change as it compares to the transactions
costs that will be incurred. The status quo configuration constrains, to some extent, the range of
possible reform. By the same token, path dependence means that a modest change may lay the
groundwork for substantial improvements in water institutions in the future.
In conclusion, economists have long been able to assess the narrow and specific
economic impact of changes in water institutions. However, the relatively new, developing and
much broader political economy model of institutional innovation can help generate real insight
into additional important aspects of change. The concepts can help economists evaluate both the
potential opportunity for beneficial (or detrimental) change and the obstacles that are likely to be
encountered. If addressed in a positive way, these concepts can help regions and countries to
adapt to changing conditions and design water institutions that can yield real improvement in the
use of water resources.
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